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Abstract
When recruiting job candidates, employers rarely observe their underlying skill level directly.
Instead, they must administer a series of interviews and/or collate other noisy signals in order
to estimate the worker’s skill. Traditional economics papers address screening models where
employers access worker skill via a single noisy signal. In this paper, we extend this theoretical
analysis to a multi-test setting, considering both Bernoulli and Gaussian models. We analyze
the optimal employer policy both when the employer sets a fixed number of tests per candidate
and when the employer can set a dynamic policy, assigning further tests adaptively based on
results from the previous tests. To start, we characterize the optimal policy when employees
constitute a single group, demonstrating some interesting trade-offs. Subsequently, we address
the multi-group setting, demonstrating that when the noise levels vary across groups, a funda-
mental impossibility emerges whereby we cannot administer the same number of tests, subject
candidates to the same decision rule, and yet realize the same outcomes in both groups.
1 Introduction
Consider an employer seeking to hire new employees. Clearly, the employer would like to hire the
best employees for the task, but how will she know which are best fit? Typically, the employee will
gather information on each candidate, including their education, work history, reference letters, and
for many jobs, they will actively conduct interviews. Altogether, this information can be viewed as
the signal available to the employer.
Suppose that candidates can be either skilled or unskilled. If the firm hires an “unskilled” candidate,
it will incur a significant cost on account of lost productivity. For this reason, the employer would
like to minimize the number of False Positive mistakes, instances where unskilled candidates are
hired. On the other hand, the employer desires not to overspend on the hiring process, limiting
the number of interviews per hired candidate (either on average, or absolutely). However, fewer
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interviews weakens the signal, causing the employer to make more mistakes. At the heart of our
model is this inherent trade-off between the quality of the signal and the cost of obtaining the signal.
This marks a departure from the classical economics literature, in which the signal is commonly
regarded as a given.
Complicating matters, hiring efficiency is not the only desiderata at play. In society, employees
belong to various demographic groups, and we may strive to design policies that are in some sense
fair vis-a-vis group membership. While fairness can be an elusive notion, regulators must translate
it to concrete rules and laws. In the United States, a body of anti-discrimination law dating to
the Civil Rights act of 1964, subjects decisions that result in disparate outcomes (as delineated by
race, age, gender, religion, etc) to extra scrutiny: employers must not only show that preference for
some groups over others did not drive the decision (disparate treatment doctrine) but also justify
that any observed disparities arise from a business necessity (disparate impact doctrine), whether
or not those disparities were intentional.
In this paper, we seek to understand how a complex hiring process would interact with the re-
quirements of fairness. We extend the theory on candidate screening and statistical discrimination,
addressing the setting in which employers can subject employees to multiple tests, which we as-
sume to be conditionally independent given the worker’s skill level and group membership. To
build intuition, most of our analysis focuses on a Bernoulli model of both worker skill and screening.
Additionally, we begin to extend the traditionally-studied Gaussian skill and screening models to
the multi-test setting (Section 5).
Unlike the classical papers, in which an employer’s hiring policy is given by a simple thresholding
rule, our setting requires greater care to derive the optimal employer policy. In our setting, we
imagine that the employer wishes to minimize the number of tests performed subject to a con-
straint upper-bounding the false positive rate. We characterize the optimal policy in this case as a
randomized threshold policy.
We also consider the setting in which employers can allocate tests dynamically, deciding after each
result whether to (i) hire the candidate; (ii) reject the candidate and move on to the next one; or
(iii) administer a subsequent test. In the Bernoulli case, the optimal policy consists of administering
tests until each candidate’s posterior likelihood of being a high-skilled worker either dips below the
prior or rises above a threshold determined by the tolerable false positive rate. We demonstrate
that the analysis of this process can be reduced to a random walk over the log posterior odds and
derive the solution via the corresponding Gambler’s ruin problem.
Finally, we consider the ramifications for fairness within our model when employees, despite pos-
sessing similarly-distributed skills, are evaluated with differing noise levels.
1.1 Related work
The classical economics literature on discrimination in employment can broadly be divided into two
focuses. The taste-based discrimination model due to [3] models the market outcomes in a setting
where employers express an explicit preference for hiring members of one group, acting as if an
employee’s demographic membership provides utility. This preference for certain groups induces a
sorting of employees from the disadvantaged group towards those employers who discriminate the
least with wages ultimately determined by the marginal discriminator. Subsequently, [16] suggested
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a statistical mechanism by which similarly-skilled employees from different groups might experience
differential outcomes: the comparative difficulty of screening from one group vs. another. Many
subsequent works extend this analysis, typically focusing on Gaussian models of worker quality
and conditionally-Gaussian test scores [2, 1]. These papers consider the setting where workers are
assessed via a single test characterized by a group-dependent noise level. Our work is differentiated
from these by considering richer mechanisms for acquiring signal.
In the more recent literature on fairness in machine learning, researchers often focus on binary
classification, with employees characterized by a protected characteristic (group membership), and
other (non-protected) covariates [15, 11, 12]. There, the predictor is presumably used to guide a con-
sequential decision, such as allocating some economic good (loans, jobs, etc.) [6] or assessing some
penalty (e.g. risk scores to guide bail decisions) [5]. Papers then focus on various interventions
for ensuring accurate prediction subject to various constraints such as demographic parity (out-
comes independent of group membership), blindness (model cannot observe group membership),
and equalized false negative and/or false positive rates [9]. Several simple impossibility results
preclude simultaneously satisfying several combinations of these parities [4, 5, 13]. More recently,
a number of papers have drawn inspiration from economic modeling, extending the literature on
fairness in classification to consider longer-term dynamics, equilibria, and the emergence of feed-
back loops [10, 9, 7]. Finally, [17] provide a survey of definitions from the algorithmic fairness
literature.
2 The Bernoulli Model
We formalize our problem as follows. An employer accesses an infinite pool of candidates (indexed
by i ∈ N+), each of which has some (hidden) skill level yi ∈ {0,+1}, which denote unskilled and
skilled, respectively. Underlying worker skill levels yi are sampled independently from a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter p. An employer can access information about the i-th candidate through
a sequence of τ tests, which are conditionally independent given yi. Each test result, yˆi,j ∈ {0,+1}
disagrees with the ground truth skill with probability Pr[yˆi,j 6= yi] =
1−σ
2 , where σ ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
yˆi,j = yi ⊕Br(
1−σ
2 )
1. For convenience, we denote the noise level as η = 1−σ2 ∈ (0,
1
2 ). We say that
a test result yˆi,j is flipped if yˆi,j 6= yi, and the number of flipped results for a given candidate is
denoted by Zητ is Z
η
τ =
∑τ
j=1 I(yˆi,j 6= yi), where I(·) is the indicator function.
A selection criterion is a mapping between test results to actions: Select(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τi) ∈ {0, 1},
where 0 means reject and 1 means accept (hire). A policy π sets the selection criteria based
on σ, p and other possible constraints such as probability to hire, error probability, etc. A ran-
domized threshold policy is a policy π with parameters (τ, θ, r) such that π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τi) = 1
for Sτ :=
∑τ
i=1 yˆi,j > θ, π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τi) = 0 for Sτ < θ, and for Sτ = θ the probability that
π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τi) = 1 is r. We call a policy π a threshold policy if r = 1. In a dynamic policy, rather
than setting a fixed number of tests per candidate, the employer may decide after each test whether
to accept, reject, or to perform an additional test, i.e., π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τi) ∈ {0, 1, more}. Note that
for a dynamic policy, the number of tests τ is a random variable determined based on the tests’
outcomes. When designing a policy, one must carefully consider the balance between the following
desiderata:
1⊕ is the XOR operation between two binary random variables, and therefore yˆi,j is also a random variable.
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1. Minimize False Discovery Rate (FDR)—the fraction of unskilled workers among the
accepted candidates, i.e., FDR := Pr[yi = 0|π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = +1].
2. Minimize False Omission Rate (FOR)—the fraction of skilled workers among the rejected
candidates, i.e., FOR := Pr[yi = +1|π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0].
3. Minimize False Negatives (FN)—the amount of skilled workers that are classified as
unskilled.
4. Minimize False Positives (FP)—the amount of unskilled workers that are classified as
skilled.
5. Ratio of accept probability and the number of tests—the number of tests performed
per candidate hired, using a parameter B > 1, we have τB ≤ Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = +1].
For any fixed number of tests τ , increasing the threshold θ of a threshold policy decreases FDR
while increasing FOR.
Loss: To handle the trade-off between the false positives, (i.e., when an unskilled candidate is
accepted) and false negatives (i.e., when a skilled candidate is rejected), we introduce an α-loss,
paramaterized by α ∈ [0, 1] and defined as follows:
ℓα(b1, b2) = αI[b1 = 0, b2 = 1] + (1− α)I[b1 = 1, b2 = 0]
where I[·] is the indicator function and b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}. The expected loss of a policy π is,
lα(π) = E[ℓα(yi, π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ))] (1)
where the expectation is over the type of the candidates yi, the test results yˆi,j , and the decisions
of π.
3 Analysis of the Bernoulli Model with One Group
To begin, we analyze this hiring model for a single group of candidates. The employer’s goal is to
minimize the expected loss, lα(π), while maintaining a given acceptance probability. For brevity,
we relegate all proofs to the appendix.
3.1 The Simple Threshold Policy (Equal Number of Tests)
Consider the setting where the employer must subject all candidates to an equal number of tests
τ and threshold θ (these parameters are chosen by the employer but thereafter constant across
candidates). For a given threshold, we can relate the flip probability (error rate) of the test to the
probability that a candidate is accepted as follows:
Recall that yˆi,j = yi ⊕ Br(η), Sτ =
∑τ
j=1 yˆi,j , that Z
η
τ =
∑τ
t=1 I(yˆi,j 6= yi), and that τ and θ are
the only parameters of the threshold policy, π. Informally, Sτ is the number of passed tests and
Zητ is the number of flips (tests in error). The probability of hiring an unskilled candidate is given
by:
Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0] = Pr[Sτ ≥ θ|yi = 0] = Pr[Z
η
τ ≥ θ].
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Since Zητ is a binomial random variable with parameters τ and η, we can calculate this probability
precisely as: Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0] = Pr[Z
η
τ ≥ θ] =
∑τ
k=θ
(
τ
k
)
ηk(1 − η)τ−k, and the
probability of rejecting a skilled candidate is the probability that they encounter more than τ − θ
flips, thus: Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0|yi = +1] = Pr[Sτ < θ|y = +1] = Pr[Z
η
τ > τ − θ] =∑τ
k=τ−θ+1
(
τ
k
)
ηk(1−η)τ−k. Similarly, given a candidate’s skill level, we can calculate the probability
that they obtain exactly k positive tests out of τ , i.e,
Pr[Sτ = k|yi = 0] = Pr[Z
η
τ = k] =
(
τ
k
)
ηk(1− η)τ−k.
Pr[Sτ = k|yi = +1] = Pr[Z
η
τ = τ − k] =
(
τ
k
)
ητ−k(1− η)k.
Given these observations, we can now analyze the employer’s choices.
Optimal solution for any ratio α ∈ (0, 1)
The next theorem shows that for threshold policies, the expected loss lα(π) = lα(θ) is minimized
at θ∗p,α such that |θ
∗
p,α − τ/2| ≤
log( 1
p
)+log( 1
α
)
2 log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
.
Theorem 1. The loss function lα(θ) is quasi-convex and a threshold of θ
∗
p,α =
⌈
1
2
(
τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)⌉
minimizes loss for any values of α, p, σ ∈ (0, 1). Namely,
θ∗p,α = argmin
θ
lα(θ) =
⌈
τ
2
−
log( 1p − 1) + log(
1
α − 1)
2 log(1 + 2σ1−σ )
⌉
.
Next, we bound the number of tests required to guarantee that the probability of classification error
by the majority decision rule (i.e., θ = ⌈ τ2 ⌉) does not exceed a specified quantity δ.
Theorem 2. For every δ, p, α ∈ (0, 1), performing τ = Ω(α+p−2pασ2 ln(
1
δ )) tests per candidate and
using majority as a decision rule (i.e., θ = τ/2) guarantees lα(π) ≤ δ.
Equal cost for false positives and false negatives (α = 12 )
Consider the simple loss consisting of the classification error rate (false positives and false negatives
count equally), expressed via our loss function by setting α = 12 . When skilled and unskilled
candidates occur with equal frequency, i.e., p = 1/2, we can derive that the majority decision rule
minimizes the classification error for any number of tests.
Corollary 3. Assume p = 1/2 and α = 1/2. For any number of tests τ , the majority decision rule
minimizes loss lα. Namely, argminθ l 1
2
(θ) = ⌈ 12τ⌉. In addition, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), performing
τ = Ω( 1σ2 ln(
1
δ )) tests per candidate and using majority as a decision rule guarantees classification
error with probability of at most δ.
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FDR minimization with limited number of tests per hire for balanced groups Again,
assuming balanced groups (i.e., p = 1/2), suppose that an employer would like to minimize the false
discovery rate, subject to the constraint of lower bounding the hiring probability. We can model
this optimization problem by introducing a budget parameter B > 1 to bound any predetermined
(fixed) number of tests per hired candidate as follows:
argmin
π
FDRπ = Pr[yi = 0|Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1]
subject to
τπ
Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1]
≤ B
(2)
where τπ is the number of tests π performs. The following theorem shows that the optimal policy
is a randomized threshold policy.
Theorem 4. There exists a randomized threshold policy π which is an optimal solution for (2).
3.2 The Dynamic Policy (Adaptively-Allocated Tests)
Recall that under a dynamic policy, the employer can decide after each test whether to accept,
reject, or perform another test. In general, dynamic policies are more efficient than those that must
set a fixed number of tests. To build intuition, consider a candidate that has passed 2 out of 3 tests.
As seen above, under an optimally-constructed fixed-test policy, any candidate that fails a single
test might be rejected. 2 However, the posterior probability that this candidate is in fact skilled
may still be greater than that of a fresh candidate sampled from the pool. Thus we can improve
on the fixed-test policy by dynamically allocating more tests to candidates until their posterior
odds either dip below the prior odds or rise above the threshold for hiring. The following theorem
formalizes this notion that it is better to administer more tests to a candidate that passed the
majority of previous tests than to start afresh with a new candidate:
Theorem 5. For any p, σ, τ , a candidate i that passed θ > τ2 out of τ tests is more likely to
be a skilled than a freshly-sampled candidate i′ for whom no test results are yet available, i.e.,
Pr[yi′ = +1] = p < Pr[yi = +1|Sτ = θ].
Remark 6. If θ < τ2 , the inequality would have been reversed.
The Greedy Policy We now present a greedy algorithm that continues to test a candidate so
long as the posterior probability that yi = +1 is greater than ǫ
′ and smaller than 1 − ǫ, rejects a
candidate whenever the posterior falls below ǫ′ (absent fairness concerns, employers will set ǫ′ = p
for all groups), and accepts whenever the posterior rises above 1 − ǫ. Given parameters ǫ, ǫ′ > 0,
we show that the greedy policy solves the optimization problem of minimizing the mean number of
tests under these constraints, i.e.,
minimize
τ
E[τ ]
subject to ∀iπ(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1 iff Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ] ≥ 1− ǫ
∀iπ(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0 iff Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ] < ǫ
′
Our analysis of this policy builds upon the observation that conditioned on a worker’s skill, the
posterior log-odds after each test perform a one-dimensional random walk, starting with the prior
2For example, if B = 18 and η = 1
3
, the lowest false discovery rate is achieved by τ = θ = 3.
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log-odds log( p1−p ) and moving, after each test result, either left (upon a failed test) or right (upon
a passed test). When (as in our model) the probability of a flip are equal for skilled and unskilled
candidates, our random walk has a fixed step size. Moreover, our random walk has absorbing
barriers corresponding to (when ǫ′ = p) falling below the prior log odds (on the left) and exceeding
the hiring threshold (on the right). Owing to the fixed step size and absorbing barriers, our policy
resembles the classic problem of Gambler’s ruin, in which a gambler wins or loses a unit of currency
at each step, and loses when crossing a threshold on the left (going bankrupt) or on the right
(bankrupting the opponent). We formalize the random walk as follows where Xj is the position on
the walk at time j:
1. X0 is the prior log-odds of the candidate, i.e., X0 = log
p
1−p .
2. After each test result, yˆi,j is observed, Xj = Xj−1 + (2yˆi,j − 1) · log
(
Pr[yˆi,j=+1|yi=+1]
Pr[yˆi,j=+1|yi=0]
)
.
Let πGreedy be the policy that accepts a candidate if Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,j ] ≥ 1 − ǫ, rejects if
Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,j ] < ǫ
′, and otherwise conducts an additional test, i.e.,
πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,j) =


0 if Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,j ] < ǫ
′
1 if Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,j ] ≥ 1− ǫ
retest else
.
An employer will generally set the lower absorbing barrier to reject all candidates with posterior
log odds less than p since a fresh candidate from the pool is expected to be better. However, when
noise levels differ across groups, we may prefer in the interest of fairness to set ǫ′ lower than p for
members of the noisier group, allowing us to equalize the frequency of false negatives across groups
(see Section 4).
Lemma 7. Let β, β′ ∈ R be the parameters that satisfy ββ+1 = 1−ǫ and
β′
β′+1 = ǫ
′ (i.e., β = 1−ǫǫ and
β′ = ǫ
′
1−ǫ′ ). Then Xτ ≥ log β iff Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ] ≥ 1− ǫ (iff the candidate is accepted) and
Xτ < log β
′ iff Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ] < ǫ
′ (iff the candidate is rejected).
Corollary 8. The policy πGreedy can be described as follows.
πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) =


0 if Xτ < log
ǫ′
1−ǫ′
1 if Xτ ≥ log(
1−ǫ
ǫ )
retest else
We use the following parameters in the next theorems:
a =


log( (1−ǫ)(1−ǫ
′)(1+σ)
ǫǫ′(1−σ) )
log(1+σ1−σ )

≫
1
σ
and z =


log(p(1−ǫ
′)(1+σ)
ǫ′(1−p)(1−σ) )
log(1+σ1−σ )


Theorem 9 (Expected number of tests per type). The expected number of tests until a decision
(namely accept or reject) for skilled candidates is E[τs] =
1
σ
(
a ·
1−( 1−σ
1+σ
)z
1−( 1−σ
1+σ
)a
− z
)
≈ 2a1+σ −
z
σ and
E[τu] =
1
σ
(
z − a ·
1−( 1+σ
1−σ
)z
1−( 1+σ
1−σ
)a
)
≈ zσ for unskilled candidates.
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Table 1: Confusion matrix for πgreedy assuming ǫ ≤ 1/4 and ǫ
′ ≤ p ≤ 1/2.
General ǫ′ When ǫ′ = p
Skilled (yi = +1) Unskilled (yi = 0) Skilled Unskilled
accept TPR = Θ
(
1− ǫ
′
p
(1− σ)
)
FPR = Θ(ǫ(p− ǫ′ + ǫ′σ)) Θ(σ) Θ(ǫpσ)
reject FNR = Θ
(
ǫ′
p
(1− σ)
)
TNR = Θ(1− ǫ(p− ǫ′ + ǫ′σ)) Θ(1− σ) Θ(1− ǫpσ)
For the probabilities of the candidates to be accepted or rejected, conditioned on their true skill
level, we present the results in a form of confusion matrix in Table 1.
Theorem 10. The expected number of tests until deciding whether to accept or reject a candidate
is E[τ |π(yi,τ ) ∈ {0, 1}] ≈
ap
σ , where a≫
1
σ .
4 Fairness Considerations in the Two-Group Setting
Two Groups—Threshold Policies We now discuss the effects of a threshold policy when can-
didates belong to two groups, G1 and G2 whose skill level is distributed identically, but whose tests
are characterized by different noise levels. Without loss of generality, we assume that η1 < η2,
where ηi is the probability that a test result of a candidate from Gi is different from his skill level.
To begin, we note the fundamental irreconcilability of equalizing either the false positive or the
false negative rates across groups with subjecting candidates to the same policy.
Theorem 11 (Impossibility result). When noise levels differ between two groups with identical
skill level distribution, a single Threshold Policy π (with the same number of tests τ and the same
threshold θ for both groups) cannot have equality in either the false negative rates or in the false
positive rates across the groups. Particularly, there is a higher false positive rate in the noisier
group, as an unskilled candidate from G2 is more likely to be accepted by the threshold policy than
an unskilled candidate from G1:
FPRη1θ,τ = Prη1
[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0] < Pr
η2
[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0] = FPR
η2
θ,τ ,
and also a higher false negative rate, as a skilled candidate from G2 is more likely to be rejected
than a skilled candidate from G1:
FNRη1θ,τ = Prη1
[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0|yi = +1] < Pr
η2
[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0|yi = +1] = FNR
η2
θ,τ .
Connection to Economics Literature Aigner and Cain [1] discuss a similar case under a Gaus-
sian screening model where the variance (noise level) of the single test differs across the two groups.
Similarly, they note that qualified candidates fare worse in the noisy group but that unqualified
candidates fare better in the noisier group. Our work differs from theirs in that we consider the
effect of multiple tests and the ability to optimize over the number of tests.
Two Groups–Dynamic policy We now consider the (dynamic) hiring policy in the setting
when employees belong to two groups, G1 and G2 with identically-distributed skills but different
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noise levels η1 < η2. We note that there are two ingredients that explain the differences among the
groups: (i) The step size, log
(
Pr[yˆi,j=+1|yi=+1]
Pr[yˆi,j=+1|yi=0]
)
= log
(
1−η
η
)
of G2 (the noisier group) is smaller
than the step size of G1. Thus these candidates must typically pass more tests before they are
accepted; and (ii) Skilled candidates in group G2 exhibit less drift to the right (they have a higher
probability of failing a test). Consequently, when an employer (rationally) sets ǫ′ = p for all groups,
a skilled candidate from G2 is more likely to be fail a test in step 1, at which point the dynamic
policy summarily rejects them. These two facts explain both the higher false negative rates for G2
and the longer expected duration until acceptance. By setting ǫ′ < p for members of the noisier
group, we can equalize false negative rates. Precisely, setting ǫ′ = η1η2 p achieves the desired parity.
The cost of this intervention is that it requires more tests for candidates from the noisier group.
Here, our random walk analysis can be leveraged to determine exactly how many more. Once again,
we cannot provide equality across the groups in all desired ways—the same acceptance criterion,
the same expected number of tests, and the same false negative rates between groups—with the
noise differs across groups.
5 Gaussian Worker Screening Model
In this section, we work out the analytic solutions for the conditional expectation of worker qualities
given a series of conditionally independent tests Y1, ...Yn s.t. ∀i, j, Yi ⊥ Yj |Q. We assume that the
worker quality Q normally distributed with mean µQ and variance σ
2
Q, so instead of binary skill
level we have continuous quality of candidates. Conditioned on Q = q, each test is generated
according to the structural equation yi = q + η, where η is a normally distributed noise term with
mean 0 and variance σ2η. Equivalently, we can say that the conditional distribution for each test
P (Y |Q = q) is Gaussian with mean q and variance σ2η. We refer the reader to Appendix B for
further details.
We show that we can equalize conditional variance between the two groups by giving more interviews
to to noisier group, and that it yields the same conditional expectations.
Theorem 12. For two groups, G1, G2 with the same worker quality Q, that differ only in the
variance of their noise σ2η1 < σ
2
η2 , the variance can be equalized by using n2 =
σ2η2
σ2η1
n1 interviews (or
tests) for G2, where n1 is the number of interviews for each candidate from G1.
Theorem 13. When equalizing conditional variances between G1, G2 by using n2 =
σ2η2
σ2η1
n1, we get
the same conditional expectations, Eη1 [Q|Y1, ..., Yn1 ] = Eη2 [Q|Y1, ..., Yn2 ].
6 Unsupervised Parameter Estimation
Now, under the assumption of realizable case, we explain how one can estimate the parameters p
and σ given tests results from a homogeneous population. Surprisingly, we discover that parameter
recovery in this model does not require any ground truth labels indicating whether an employee
is skilled or unskilled. We use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the absolute difference between
the estimated parameters and the true parameters by choosing δ as the wanted upper bound and
solving for the number of samples or ǫ.
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Lemma 14 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let y1, . . . , ym be σ
2−sub–gaussian random variables. Then,
for any ǫ > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
i=1
yi − E[yi]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2e−mǫ
2/2σ2 .
If y1, . . . , ym are Bernoulli random variables with parameter p,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
i=1
yi − p
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2e−2mǫ
2
.
We start by estimating σ and then use it to derive an estimate for p. The estimated parameters are
denoted by σˆ and pˆ. Notice that in order to have any information regarding the true value of σ, we
need to have candidates with at least two tests. Hence, from now on we assume exactly that, i.e.,
∀iπGreedy(yˆi,1) = more for dynamic policies and τ ≥ 2 for fixed number of tests policies.
Now, in both policies we have showed that the optimal rule is to reject candidates that fail their
first test. Therefore inconsistencies between the first two tests are seen only in cases where yˆi,1 =
1, yˆi,2 = 0.
Let c be the number of inconsistencies in the first two tests, i.e., c = |{(yˆi,1, yˆi,2) : yi,1 6= yi,2}|,
and let m be the number of candidates with at least two tests. Since c is generated by sampling m
times, the distribution Br((1+σ2 )(
1−σ
2 )) = Br(
1−σ2
4 ) and we can estimate σ as stated in the next
theorem:
Theorem 15. If we have results from m ≥ 12ǫ2 ln
2
δ candidates, by using σˆ =
√
1− 4 cm , then with
probability 1− δ we have that |σˆ − σ| ≤ ǫ.
Having an estimation of the parameter σˆ, we can calculate the estimated p as follows: Let pyˆ∗,1=1 :=∑
i I(yˆi,1=1)
m be the percentage of positive first tests. Since this number is generated by the distribu-
tion Br(12 (p(1 + σ) + (1− p)(1− σ))) = Br(
1
2 + (2p− 1)
σ
2 ), we can estimate pˆ using the estimated
value of σˆ.
Theorem 16. If we have results from m ≥ 12ǫ2 ln
2
δ candidates, by using pˆ =
2(py
∗,1=1
−1)+σˆ
σˆ , we get
that with probability 1− δ we have that |pˆ− p| ≤ 2ǫ.
Under the Gaussian screening model, the parameter estimation is also straightforward (assuming
realizability) without access to the true skill level of the employees. We start by looking at a single
candidate, i. Each of his test results, yˆi,j is generated from a conditional distribution P (Yi|Qi = qi)
which is a Gaussian with mean qi and variance σ
2
η. Since this variance is common among all the
candidates, we can simply average the estimated variance of every candidate to get an approximation
for σ2η. Suppose yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,n is a sequence of n i.i.d tests of candidate i, and let yi =
1
n
∑n
j=1 yi,j
be the empirical mean of candidate i’s tests.
The following theorem is a result from Hoeffding’s Inequality, in which we use to bound the error
of our estimated parameters.
Theorem 17. By using the following as estimators for Gaussian parameters µˆQ =
1
m
∑m
i=1 yi,
σˆ2η =
1
m
∑m
i=1
1
n
∑n
j=1(yi,j−yi)
2 and σˆ2Q =
1
m
∑m
i=1(µˆQ−yi)
2 (notice that E[σˆ2η] = σ
2
η and E[σˆ
2
Q] =
σ2Q), the difference between each parameter and it’s estimator is bounded by O(
√
1
m ln(
1
δ )).
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7 Discussion and Future Work
Consider two groups with identically-distributed skills and characterized by different noise levels
in screening. Our results demonstrate that if a regulatory body (e.g., policymakers or a regulator)
insists on the same number of tests and the same decision rule for both groups, this would yield
higher false positive rates in any threshold policy. As a result, hired candidates from the noisier
group would suffer higher rates of firing. In turn, this might lead employers to erroneously conclude
that this group’s skill level is lower than it actually is. This paper presents a policy that handles
this problem by minimizing the false positive rates of both groups, in the form of a greedy policy.
Moreover the greedy policy is efficient, minimizing the expected number of tests per hire among all
policies that achieve a specified false positive rate and continue testing every candidates that appear
better than the a new one. However, the dynamic policy will still suffer (as does the simple threshold
policy) from higher false negative rates for the noisier group, violating a notion of fairness dubbed
equality of opportunity in the recent literature on fairness in machine learning [9]. We addressed
this problem by modifying the greedy policy to reject candidate iff Pr[yi = +1|yˆi,1 . . . yˆi,τ ] < ǫ
′ by
setting ǫ′ < p. Our greedy policy can be made forgiving and equalize false negative rates across
groups. In future work, we plan to explore extensions to the Gaussian model.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the theorem, we show that the loss function lα(τ, θ), as a function
of θ is quasi-convex and achieves its minimum value at
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
.
Namely, we show that the loss is monotone increasing for
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
≤ θ ≤ τ − 1,
i.e., increasing θ increases the loss: lα(θ) < lα(θ + 1).
Similarly, we show that for 1 ≤ θ ≤
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
, we have lα(θ) < lα(θ − 1).
Indeed,
lα(θ + 1, τ)− lα(θ, τ) = −αPr[y = 0, Sτ = θ] + (1− α) Pr[y = +1, Sτ = θ]
= −αPr[Sτ = θ|y = 0]Pr[y = 0] + (1 − α) Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1]Pr[y = +1]
Since Pr[y = 0] = 1− p and Pr[y = +1] = p, we have
l 1
2
(θ + 1, τ)− l 1
2
(θ, τ) = −(1− p)αPr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] + p(1− α) Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1].
The above expression is positive iff
(1 − p)αPr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] < p(1− α) Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1] (3)
Since Pr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] is the probability of exactly θ flips, and Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1] is the probability
of exactly τ − θ flips, we can calculate those probabilities as follows:
Pr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] =
(
τ
θ
)
(
1 − σ
2
)θ(
1 + σ
2
)τ−θ
Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1] =
(
τ
τ − θ
)
(
1− σ
2
)τ−θ(
1 + σ
2
)θ
Substituting expression in (3), we get
(1− p)α
(
τ
θ
)
(
1− σ
2
)θ(
1 + σ
2
)τ−θ < p(1− α)
(
τ
τ − θ
)
(
1− σ
2
)τ−θ(
1 + σ
2
)θ.
Rearranging, we get
(
1− σ
1 + σ
)2θ < (
1 − σ
1 + σ
)τ (
p
1− p
)(
1− α
α
).
Applying log on both sides gets us
2θ log(
1− σ
1 + σ
) < τ log(
1 − σ
1 + σ
) + log(
p
1− p
) + log(
1− α
α
).
Solving for θ, we find that the inequality holds if
θ >
τ log(1−σ1+σ ) + log(
p
1−p ) + log(
1−α
α )
2 log(1−σ1+σ )
=
⌈
1
2
(τ −
log( 1p − 1) + log(
1
α − 1)
log(1 + 2σ1−σ )
)
⌉
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For θ ≥
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
, we have
(1− p)αPr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] < p(1− α) Pr[Sτ = θ|y = +1],
and for θ ≤
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
, we have
α(1− p) Pr[Sτ = θ|y = 0] > (1− α)pPr[Sτ = θ|y = +1].
This implies that the maximum is θ∗p,α =
⌈
1
2 (τ −
log( 1
p
−1)+log( 1
α
−1)
log(1+ 2σ
1−σ
)
)
⌉
.
Proof of Theorem 2. We start with a skilled candidate. The expected number of tests that a skilled
candidate passes is E[Sτ |y = +1] = τ(
1+σ
2 ) >
τ
2 .
By using Hoeffding’s inequality for Bernoulli distributions, for every ǫ > 0,
Pr[E[Sτ ]− Sτ ≥ ǫ|y = +1] = Pr[τ(
1 + σ
2
)− Sτ ≥ ǫ|y = +1] ≤ e
−2ǫ2τ < δ.
Choosing ǫ = σ2 yields Sτ ≤
τ
2 < ⌈
τ
2 ⌉ (as τ is odd), which holds iff a majority threshold policy would
predict that this is an unskilled candidate (false negative). Solving for τ , we get τ > 1σ2 ln(
1
δ ).
We now repeat the process for an unskilled candidate. The expected number of tests that an
unskilled candidate passes is E[Sτ |y = 0] = τ(
1−σ
2 ) <
τ
2 .
By using Hoeffding’s inequality again, we have
Pr[Sτ − E[Sτ ] ≥ ǫ|y = 0] = Pr[Sτ − τ(
1 − σ
2
) ≥ ǫ|y = 0] ≤ e−2ǫ
2τ < δ
Choosing ǫ = σ2 yields Sτ >
τ
2 , which holds iff a majority threshold falsely predicts that this is a
skilled candidate (false positive). Solving for τ again, we get τ > 1σ2 ln(
1
δ ).
Overall, τ > α(1−p)σ2 ln(
1
δ ) +
p(1−α)
σ2 ln(
1
δ ) = Ω(
α+p−2pα
σ2 ln(
1
δ ))
Proof of Theorem 4. Let π′ be any optimal policy for (2) (not necessarily threshold) with a fixed
number of tests, τ . We will show, in two steps, how to transform it into an optimal randomized
threshold policy. The first step is to symmetrize π′. Let rk = Pr[π(yˆ) = 1|Sτ = k]. Define a policy
π′′, which performs τ tests, and accepts with probability rk where k = Sτ . Clearly, both π
′ and π′′
have the same accept probability. In addition, since condition on Sτ = k, any sequence of outcomes
is equally likely. Furthermore, and the probability that y = 1 given any sequence of outcomes with
Sτ = k, is identical. (Technically, Sτ is a sufficient statistics.) This implies that the false discovery
rate is also unchanged.
This yields that π with the randomization vector r is also optimal.
The second step is to suppose—for sake of contradiction—that π′′ is not a randomized threshold
policy. We will show that we can improve the FDR of π′′ while keeping the probability of acceptance
unchanged. This will contradict the hypothesis that π′ is optimal.
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If π′′ is not a randomized threshold policy, then there is no θ and k, such that
rk = Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|Sτ = k 6= θ] =
{
0, if k < θ
1 if k > θ
.
Now, let k be the minimal value such that rk > 0 and let 0 < i < τ − k be the minimal value
for which 0 < rk+i < 1. Clearly, the FDR is lower at Sτ = k + i than at Sτ = k. Intuitively, we
can shift some probability mass, ǫk > 0 from rk to rk+i in a way that maintains the acceptance
probability of π and decreases the false positive rates.
Let ǫk+i > 0 be such that ǫk · rk = ǫk+i · rk+i. Let r
′ be a modified randomization vector for
π such that r′k = rk(1 − ǫk), r
′
k+i = rk+i(1 + ǫk+i) and for every l /∈ {k, k + i} r
′
l = rl. Since
Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1] =
∑τ
l=1 rl =
∑
l/∈{k,k+i} rl + r
′
k + r
′
k+i, the acceptance probability remains
the same. As for the false discovery rate, since Pr[yi = 0|Sτ = k + i] < Pr[yi = 0|Sτ = k],
Pr[Sτ = k + i] is higher with r
′ than with r, Pr[Sτ = k] is lower with r
′ than with r and for any
l /∈ {k, k + i}, Pr[Sτ = l] with r
′ is the same as with r, the false discovery rate with r′ is lower,
which contradicts the optimality of π with r as the randomization vector.
Proof of Theorem 5. Using Bayes’ theorem, the conditional probability can be decomposed as
Pr[yi = +1|Sτ = θ] =
Pr[yi = +1]Pr[Sτ = θ|yi = +1]
Pr[Sτ = θ]
=
p
(
τ
θ
)
(1−σ2 )
τ−θ(1+σ2 )
θ
p
(
τ
θ
)
(1−σ2 )
τ−θ(1+σ2 )
θ + (1− p)
(
τ
τ−θ
)
(1+σ2 )
τ−θ(1−σ2 )
θ
.
Since τ − θ < θ and
(
τ
θ
)
=
(
τ
τ−θ
)
, we get
p(1 + σ)2θ−τ
p(1 + σ)2θ−τ + (1− p)(1 − σ)2θ−τ
=
p(1+σ1−σ )
2θ−τ
p(1+σ1−σ )
2θ−τ + 1− p
.
Since (1+σ1−σ ) > 1 it holds that (
1+σ
1−σ )
2θ−τ > 1,
(
1 + σ
1− σ
)2θ−τ (1− p) > 1− p.
So,
(
1 + σ
1 − σ
)2θ−τ > p(
1 + σ
1− σ
)2θ−τ + 1− p,
And finally,
Pr[yi′ = +1] = p <
p(1+σ1−σ )
2θ−τ
p(1+σ1−σ )
2θ−τ + 1− p
= Pr[yi = +1|Sτ = θ].
Proof of Lemma 7. Let S′τ =
∑τ
j=1(2yˆi,j−1), and let sτ ∈ {−τ, . . . , τ} be any of the possible values
of S′τ . Note that
Pr[yˆi,j = 1|yi = 1]
Pr[yˆi,j = 1|yi = 0]
=
1 + σ
1− σ
.
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Since the yˆi,j are i.i.d., we have
Xτ =X0 +
τ∑
j=1
(2yˆi,j − 1) · log(
Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi = +1]
Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi = 0]
)
= log(
p
1− p
) + Sτ log(
1 + σ
1− σ
)
= log((
p
1− p
)(
1 + σ
1 − σ
)Sτ ).
Since
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 1]
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 0]
= (
1 + σ
1− σ
)sτ ,
we have
Xτ = log((
p
1 − p
)(
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 1]
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 0]
)). (4)
Since
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 1] =
Pr[Sτ = sτ ] · Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
Pr[yi = 1]
and
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 0] =
Pr[Sτ = sτ ] · Pr[yi = 0|Sτ = sτ ]
Pr[yi = 0]
,
assigning Pr[yi = 0] = 1− p and Pr[yi = 1] = p, we get
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 1]
Pr[Sτ = sτ |yi = 0]
=
(1− p) · Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
p · Pr[yi = 0|Sτ = sτ ]
. (5)
Applying (5) in (4) and adding Xτ ≥ log β gives us
Xτ = log
(
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
Pr[yi = 0|Sτ = sτ ]
)
= log
(
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
1− Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
)
≥ log β
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
1− Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
≥ β
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ] ≥ β(1− Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ])
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ] ≥
β
1 + β
Applying (5) in (4) and adding Xτ < log β
′ gives us
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
1− Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ]
< β′
Hence
Pr[yi = 1|Sτ = sτ ] <
β′
1 + β′
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Proof of Theorem 9. First recall that given a skilled candidate, for every test j,
Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi = +1] =
1 + σ
2
Pr[yˆi,j = 0|yi = +1] =
1− σ
2
Hence
Pr[yˆi,j = 0|yi = 1]− Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi = 1] = −σ.
The lower absorbing barrier is reached when a candidate’s posterior skill level is lower than the
prior of the skill level, i.e.,
log
ǫ′
1− ǫ′
− log
(
1 + σ
1− σ
)
and the starting point is just one step away from the lower absorbing barrier:
X0 = log
p
1− p
.
According to Corollary 8, the upper absorbing barrier is in
log(
1 − ǫ
ǫ
).
To derive the results for the expected duration of the random walk for skilled and unskilled candi-
dates, we shift the locations of the absorbing points so that the lower barrier would be in 0 and also
divide them by a step size (so now we have that every step is of size 1). The new upper absorbing
barrier is at
a =
⌈
log(1−ǫǫ )− (log
ǫ′
1−ǫ′ − log(
1+σ
1−σ ))
log(1+σ1−σ )
⌉
=


log( (1−ǫ)(1−ǫ
′)(1+σ)
ǫǫ′(1−σ) )
log(1+σ1−σ )

 .
And we also shift the starting point:
z =
⌈
log p1−p − (log
ǫ′
1−ǫ′ − log(
1+σ
1−σ ))
log(1+σ1−σ )
⌉
=


log(p(1−ǫ
′)(1+σ)
ǫ′(1−p)(1−σ) )
log(1+σ1−σ )


As stated in [8], the expected duration of a random walk with absorbing barriers of 0 and a from
z = 1 is (equation 3.4, chapter XIV [page 348]):
E[τs] = E[Dz=1] =
1
q − p
(
z − a ·
1− ( qp )
z
1− ( qp )
a
)
=
1
−σ
(
z − a ·
1− (1−σ1+σ )
z
1− (1−σ1+σ )
a
)
.
Hence,
E[τs] =
1
σ
(
a ·
1− (1−σ1+σ )
z
1− (1−σ1+σ )
a
− z
)
.
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As for unskilled candidates, the absorbing points and the starting point are the same, the only
difference is that
Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi] =
1− σ
2
and
Pr[yˆi,j = 0|yi = +1] =
1 + σ
2
.
Therefore,
Pr[yˆi,j = 0|yi = 0]− Pr[yˆi,j = +1|yi = 0] = σ
and we deduce
E[τu] =
1
σ
(
z − a ·
1− (1+σ1−σ )
z
1− (1+σ1−σ )
a
)
.
Deviations for the confusion matrix (Table 1). We split the claim in the confusion matrix (Table
1) into two parts. First, using equation (2.4) from chapter XIV [page 345] in [8], we get
FNR = Pr[πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0|yi = +1] =
(1−σ1+σ )
a − (1−σ1+σ )
z
(1−σ1+σ )
a − 1
and
TNR = Pr[πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 0|yi = 0] =
(1+σ1−σ )
a − (1+σ1−σ )
z
(1+σ1−σ )
a − 1
.
The second part follows from the fact the gambler’s ruin must end in case of absorbing barriers.
TPR = Pr[πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = +1] = 1−
(1−σ1+σ )
a − (1−σ1+σ )
z
(1−σ1+σ )
a − 1
=
(1−σ1+σ )
z − 1
(1−σ1+σ )
a − 1
=
ǫ′(1−p)(1−σ)
p(1−ǫ′)(1+σ) − 1
ǫ′ǫ(1−σ)
(1−ǫ′)(1−ǫ)(1+σ) − 1
=
µ(1−p)
p − 1
ǫµ
(1−ǫ) − 1
=
(1 − ǫ)(µ(1− p)− p)
p(ǫµ− (1− ǫ))
,
Where µ := ǫ
′(1−σ)
(1−ǫ′)(1+σ) . For ǫ ≤ 1/4 and p < 1/2 we get 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1/3 and µ = Θ(ǫ
′(1 − σ)),
therefore
TPR = Θ
(
p− µ
p
)
= Θ
(
1−
ǫ′
p
(1− σ)
)
.
Hence FNR = Θ( ǫ
′
p (1− σ)).
FPR = Pr[πGreedy(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0] =
(1+σ1−σ )
z − 1
(1+σ1−σ )
a − 1
=
p(1−ǫ′)(1+σ)
(1−p)ǫ′(1−σ) − 1
(1−ǫ′)(1−ǫ)(1+σ)
ǫ′ǫ(1−σ) − 1
=
=
p
(1−p)µ − 1
(1−ǫ)
ǫµ − 1
ǫ(p− (1− p)µ)
(1− p)(1 − ǫ− ǫµ)
= Θ (ǫ(p− µ)) = Θ (ǫ(p− ǫ′ + ǫ′σ))
Hence TNR = Θ(1− ǫ(p− ǫ′ + ǫ′σ)).
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Proof of Theorem 10.
E[τ ] = E[τs]p+ E[τu](1 − p) =
=
1
σ
(
a ·
1− (1−σ1+σ )
z
1− (1−σ1+σ )
a
− z
)
p+
1
σ
(
z − a ·
1− (1+σ1−σ )
z
1− (1+σ1−σ )
a
)
(1− p) =
≈
1
σ
(
a · (1−
ǫ′
p
(1 − σ))− z
)
p+
1
σ
(z − a(ǫ(p− ǫ′ + ǫ′σ)))(1 − p) ≈
ap
σ
A.2 Proofs from Section 4
The next lemma aids in the proof of Theorem (11).
Lemma 18. Let Zηn be a Binomial random variable with parameters n ∈ N and η ∈ (0, 1). Given
a number of successes, k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we know that the probability mass function of Zηn is fk(η) :=
Pr[Zηn = k] =
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k. Let L(η|k) be the likelihood function of the event Zηn = k. Then the
maximum likelihood of fk(η) is η =
k
n . I.e.,
L(η|k) = argmaxηfk(η) = argmaxη
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k =
k
n
.
Proof of Lemma 18. We notice that
(
n
k
)
does not depend on η, thus
argmaxηfk(η) = argmaxη
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k = argmaxηη
k(1− η)n−k
The log-likelihood is particularly convenient for maximum likelihood estimation. Logarithms are
strictly increasing functions, as a result, maximizing the likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the
log-likelihood, i.e.,
argmaxηη
k(1− η)n−k = argmaxη ln(η
k(1− η)n−k) = argmaxηk ln(η) + (n− k) ln(1− η)
Differentiating (with respect to η) and comparing to zero we get
d ln(fk(η))
dη
=
k
η
−
n− k
1− η
= 0.
And after refactoring,
k(1− η) = (n− k)η
The function ln(fk(η)) is a strictly concave as its second derivative is negative,
d2 ln(fk(η))
dη2
= −
k
η2
−
n− k
(1− η)2
< 0,
And since the derivative of a strictly concave function is zero at kn , then ηˆ =
k
n is a global maximum.
Therefore, ηˆ = kn obtains absolute maximum in fk(η).
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Proof of Theorem 11. Let Zηiτ be a random variable that represents the number of flips out of a
τ -tests sequence with a noise level of ηi, i.e., Z
ηi
τ is the number of times when yj 6= y for 1 ≤ j ≤ τ .
We use Zηiτ to express Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0, η = ηi] as the probability that at least θ flips,
Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = 0, η = ηi] = Pr[Z
ηi
τ ≥ θ]
and the probability of Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|q = +1, η = ηi] as at most τ − θ flips, thus
Pr[π(yˆi,1, . . . , yˆi,τ ) = 1|yi = +1, η = ηi] = Pr[Z
ηi
τ ≤ τ − θ].
From Lemma (18) and since probability density function (pdf) are is monotone increasing, we derive
that the pdf of Zη2n satisfies monotone likelihood ratio property over the pdf of Z
η1
n . This implies
that the pdf of Zη2n also has first-order stochastic dominance over Z
η1
n by Theorem 1.1 in [18]. From
stochastic dominance, we can derive the desired inequalities
FP η1θ,τ = Pr[θ ≤ Z
η1
n ] < Pr[θ ≤ Z
η2
n ] = FP
η2
θ,τ
and
FNη1θ,τ = Pr[Z
η1
n ≤ τ − θ] < Pr[Z
η2
n ≤ τ − θ] = FN
η2
θ,τ .
B Gaussian Worker Screening Model Extension
In this extension, we characterize the conditional expectation, E[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] and the conditional
variance of Q given the testsYi, i.e., Var[Q|Y1, ..., Yn].
First, note that because P (Q) is Gaussian, and the conditionals P (Yi|Q) are all Gaussian, the joint
probability P (Q, Y1, ..., Yn) is a multivariate Gaussian. We work out the precise analytic forms for
the mean and variance of the conditional P (Q|Y1, ..., Yn) in terms of the quality and noise variances
(σ2Q and σ
2
η) and the number of tests n.
To begin, we note the properties of the joint distribution over P (Q, Y1, ..., Yn). Owing to the
generative process for our Yi, all have mean µQ, and thus the joint over the means is an n + 1-
dimensional vector (µQ, ..., µQ). The full n+ 1× n+ 1 covariance matrix Σ has the form
Σ =


σ2Q σ
2
Q . . . σ
2
Q
σ2Q σ
2
Q + σ
2
η . . . σ
2
Q
...
...
. . .
...
σ2Q σ
2
Q . . . σ
2
Q + σ
2
η

 (6)
where all off-diagonal entries Σij for i 6= j have value σ
2
Q and all diagonal entries i = j ≥ 2
corresponding to the variance of tests Yi take value σ
2
Q + σ
2
η. The top-left entry corresponds to the
variance of the test Q and thus has variance σ2Q.
We can now derive the equations for the conditional mean and conditional variance of Q|Y1, ..., Yn.
To begin, note the following basic facts about deriving conditionals from multivariate Gaussians:
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to estimate the conditional of one set of variables, given another set P (x1|x2) we can segment our
data matrix into those rows corresponding to the variables we don’t condition upon (here, just
Q) and those we do (here, Y1, .., Yn), expressing our covariance matrix in terms of the following
submatrices:
Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
Here, Σ11 ∈ R
1×1, Σ21 ∈ R
n×1, Σ21 ∈ R
1×n, and Σ22 ∈ R
n×n.
The conditional expectation E[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] is then expressed as
E[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] = µQ +Σ12Σ
−1
22 (y − µy) (7)
and the conditional variance V ar[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] can be expressed as
V ar[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] = Σ11 − Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21 (8)
which should be familiar as the Schur complement of the n × n matrix Σ22. Intuitively, this
corresponds to inverting the full matrix Σ, deleting those rows and columns corresponding to
observed variables, and then inverting the resulting (1× 1) matrix back.
What remains is to show that for the particular covariance matrix that interests us (Equation 6),
these expressions have simple analytically computable forms. Specifically we state the following
simple theorems.
Theorem 19. For jointly Gaussian variables Q, Y1, ..., Yn characterized by the covariance matrix
given in (Equation 6), the conditional expectation takes form
E[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] = µQ +

 1
σ2η
σ2
Q
+ n
, . . .

 · (y − µy) (9)
Theorem 20. For jointly Gaussian variables Q, Y1, ..., Yn characterized by the covariance matrix
given in (Equation 6), the conditional variance of Q given the tests Yi takes form
Var[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] =
1
1
σ2
Q
+ nσ2η
(10)
B.1 Proofs from Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 19. The crucial step to apply Equation 7 to this data is to work out a simple
expression for the inverse of the n × n submatrix Σ22. We recall that this matrix is symmetrical
with all diagonal entries equal to σ2Q + σ
2
η and all off diagonals equal to σ
2
Q.
We call upon a lemma due to [14]. Which states that when A is invertible and B is a rank-1 matrix,
the inverse of their sum takes the following form:
(A+B)−1 = A−1 −
1
1 + Trace(BA−1)
A−1BA−1 (11)
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We can decompose Σ22 into such an A and B by defining B to be the matrix that takes value σ
2
Q
everywhere and A to be a diagonal matrix that takes values σ2η (along the main diagonal). Thus
Σ−122 = (A+B)
−1 and we can proceed by applying the lemma.
First we note that A−1 is a diagonal matrix with all entries on the main diagonal set to 1σ2η
. Then
we note that BA−1 is an n× n matrix with all entries set to
σ2Q
σ2η
. Thus, Trace(BA−1) =
nσ2Q
σ2η
.
The matrix A−1BA−1 has all entries equal to
σ2Q
σ4η
, and thus our desired inverse Σ−122 can be expressed
as follows:
Σ−122 = (A+B)
−1 =


1
σ2η
0
. . .
0 1σ2η

− 1
1 +
nσ2
Q
σ2η


σ2Q
σ4η
. . . . . .
...
. . .
...
... . . .
. . .


Thus each off-diagonal entry takes values
−
σ2Q
σ4η
1 +
nσ2
Q
σ2η
= −
σ2Q
σ4η
1 +
nσ2
Q
σ2η
·
σ2η
σ2
Q
σ2η
σ2
Q
(12)
= −
1
σ2η
σ2η
σ2Q
+ n
(13)
= −
1
σ4η
σ2Q
+ nσ2η
(14)
and each on-diagonal entry has an additional 1σ2η
term that comes from A−1.
1
σ2η
−
1
σ4η
σ2
Q
+ nσ2η
(15)
Now that we know the precise expression for all entries of Σ−122 , we can calculate the vector-matrix
product Σ12Σ
−1
22 . Because every entry of Σ12 takes value σ
2
Q, and because every column of Σ
−1
22 has
the same n values (just in different order), the product Σ12Σ
−1
22 is an n dimensional vector, where
22
all n values are equal:
Σ12Σ
−1
22 =
[
σ2Q
σ2η
−
nσ2Q
σ4η
σ2 + nσ
2
η
, . . .
]
=


σ2Q
σ2η
(
σ4η
σ2
Q
+ nσ2η
)
nσ2Q
σ4η
σ2Q
+ nσ2η
, . . .


=

 σ2η
σ4η
σ2Q
+ nσ2η
, . . .


=

 1
σ2η
σ2
Q
+ n
, . . .

 (16)
This expression for Σ12Σ
−1
22 , together with the definition of the conditional expectation of a multi-
variate Gaussian (Equation 7) concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 20. We can now produce the expression for Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21. Because every entry of
the 1× n matrix Σ12Σ
−1
22 takes value
1
σ2η
σ2Q
+ n
and because every entry in the n× 1 matrix Σ21 takes value σ
2
Q,
Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21 =
nσ2Q
σ2η
σ2
Q
+ n
(17)
The expression for the conditional variance Var[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] follows:
Var[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] = Σ11 − Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21
= σ2Q −
nσ2Q
σ2η
σ2Q
+ n
=
σ2Q
(
σ2η
σ2Q
+ n
)
− nσ2Q
σ2η
σ2
Q
+ n
=
σ2η
σ2η
σ2Q
+ n
=
1
1
σ2
Q
+ nσ2η
(18)
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B.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 12. First, recall that
Var[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] =
1
1
σ2Q
+ nσ2η
=
σ2Qσ
2
η
σ2η + nσ
2
Q
.
Solving for n2 in the equation Var1[Q|Y1, ..., Yn1 ] = Var2[Q|Y1, ..., Yn2 ],
σ2Qσ
2
η1
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
=
σ2Qσ
2
η2
σ2η2 + n2σ
2
Q
we get
σ2η1(σ
2
η2 + n2σ
2
Q) = σ
2
η2 (σ
2
η1 + n1σ
2
Q)
and hence
σ2η1n2 = σ
2
η2n1.
Extracting n2, we find that n2 =
σ2η2
σ2η1
n1.
Proof of Theorem 13. First, recall that
E[Q|Y1, ..., Yn] = µQ +

 1
σ2η
σ2
Q
+ n
, . . .

 · (y − µy) = µQ +
[
σ2Q
σ2η + nσ
2
Q
, . . .
]
· (y − µy)
Now,
E1[Q|Y1, ..., Yn1 ]−E2[Q|Y1, ..., Yn2 ] =[
σ2Q
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
, . . .
]
· (y1 − µy)−
[
σ2Q
σ2η2 + n2σ
2
Q
, . . .
]
· (y2 − µy)
=
σ2Q
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
n1(y¯1)−
σ2Q
σ2η2 + n2σ
2
Q
n2(y¯2)
=
σ2Qn1
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
(y¯1)−
σ2Qn2
σ2η2 + n2σ
2
Q
(y¯2)
=
σ2Qn1
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
(y¯1)−
σ2Q
σ2η2
σ2η1
n1
σ2η2 +
σ2η2
σ2η1
n1σ2Q
(y¯2)
=
σ2Qn1
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
(y¯1)−
σ2Qn1
σ2η1 + n1σ
2
Q
(y¯2)
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